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BAINE

v.

CONTIN:ENTAL ASSUR. CO.

[21 C.2d

The majority opinion further states: "The interpretation
of the clause urged by appellant \vould lead to absurd and
obviously unintended results. It would mean that an insured,
'knowing that the physical ('xamination required for a life
policy was different and less strict than that required for a
policy with disability benefits, could secure the issuance of
a strip life policy, and then, immediately, without further
medical examination, demand and secure the issuance of a
life policy with disability benefits. It would als{) mean that
all persons who have life policies containing such a clause,
if they became disabled before attaidng the age of sixty,
could, upon the cOllditions set forth in the clause, secure disability insurance, and thus secure a life income after the
disability had been incurred."
A complete answer to the foregoing discussion contained in
the majority opinion is that thc insurance company could
by clear and unambiguous language have provided against
the eventualities contemplated in such discussion; that it did
not do so should not militate against the insured in the casp
at bar who is entitled to have the policy construed in a mallner which affords the greatest measure of protection to him
if such construction is equally fair with a contrary interpretation. That a similar provision has been interpreted in favol'
of the insured by the Supreme Court of.North Carolina should
be conclusive on the proposition that the provision in question is susceptible to two interpretations. The fact that an
insu:rance company first refused to issue a policy of insurance to an individual, but did so later, would afford it no
ground for denying liability which arosc under a policy so
issued.
The majority opinion, however, brushes aside the Rosenberg
case with the mere assertion that "that opinion fails to discuss the various arguments set forth in this opiuion which
we think are conclusive," and that "the reasoning of the
cited case, in our opinion, is unsound." However, I think
it can be said to the credit of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina thatfn decidill~ the Rosenberg case it did not ig-nore
settled rules of construction applicablc to insurance policies
or attempt to write a new contract for the parties. In my
humble opinion, the decision in that case excels in sound
reasoning and judicial erudition the opinion of the majority
of this court in the case at bar.
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed.
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MRS. R. W. JUDSON, SR., et al., Petitioners, v. THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
Respondent.
[lJ Appearance-General Appearance-Characterization as Special Appearance.-Whether an appearance is general or special is determined by the character of the relief sought,not
by the intention of the party that it shall or shall not operate
as one or the other. His statement that he is making aspecial appcarance is not conclusive.
..
[2J ld.-Special Appearance.-If a party appears and objects only
to the consideration of the case or any procedure in it because
the court has not acquired jurisdiction of his person, the appearance is special.
[3] ld.-General Appearance-Test.-If a party appears and asks
for any relief which ean be given only to a party in a pending
case, or which itself would be a regular proceeding in the case,
that is to say, if he raises any other question than that of
want of jurisdiction over his person, or asks relief that can
be granted only upon the hypothesis that the court has such
jm-isdiction, the appearance is general, regardless of the characterization thereof.
[4J ld.-General Appearance -' Motions-To Dismiss;-Where a
party makes a motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.,§ 583, to
dismiss an action, and such motion is based on the hypothesis
that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the movant,
he thereby makes a general appearance. The fact that the
motion was denied is of no consequence in determining the
nature of the appearance.
[5J Dismissal-Delay in Trial-Exception to Rule.-The general
rule requiring dismissal of an action not brought to trial
within five years after the filing thereof (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 583) is subject to an exception where· the case cannot be
brought to trial as a result of defendant's conduct, such as hi!'
evasive and surreptitiomi' llonduct in avoiding service of summons.

[3] See 3 Cal. JUl'. fl, 12; 3 Am. Jur. 788, 790.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appearance, §§ 8, 19; [2] Appearance, § 28; [3] Appearance, § 8; [4J Appearance, §11; [5J Dismissal, § 66.
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PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County from rendering judgment
against petiti6ners.. · Writ denied.
Macfarlane, Schaefer, Hann & Mulford, Macfarlane, Scliae..
fer'& Haun and William Gamble for Petitioners.
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, Douglas De Coster, Deputy County Counsel, and Victor L. Mindlin for Respondent.
'. 'THE COUR'l'.-Upon a further consideration of thequestions presented by the petitioners in this proceeding, t4e.
opinion upon which th~ case was decided when the m.atter
was before the District Court of Appeal, and now modified
in part, is adopted as the opinion of this court. In stating
the reasons for the decision, Mr. Justice' White .said :
"In this proceeding, th~ petitioners claim that they are
entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining respondent court
from rendering jndgnlent against petitiollers, following· (he
entry of their default in an action brought against them in
said court. On April l8, 1935, an action was commenced in
respondent superior court against petition~rs by one Oharles
R.. Bertrand, and upon t4e same date summons was issued.
On April 21, 1941, petitioners herein as .defendants in the
action served and filed a notice of motion to dismiss the action
for want of prosecution, by reason of the fact. that five years
had elapsed since the filing thereof. (§ 583, Code Civ. Proc;)
In the aforesaid notice or motion it was stated specifically
that the. moving parties 'will make a special appearance for
the purpose of, moving this Court for an order dismissing
the above. entitled a~tion.' Without narrating in detail ,each
and all of the acts done by plaintiff in the action to effect
service of complaint· and summons upon petitioners, as de'fendants th('rein, suffice it to 'Say that at the hearing of the
aforesaid motioti in respondent court, there were introduced
various affidavits £romwh~chit appeared that plaintiff had
made constant,diligent an'd ttnceasing, but unavgiling, efforts
to serve petitioners with process thr6ughoutthe years interveningbetween the filing o:fthe action and the hearing on
the motion to dismiss same. Based upon such affidavits; the
filing of which is alleged in respondent court's answer t10the
petitiQ~ herein, and which filing is undenied, the court denieq
the motion of petitioners ontlie 'ground that 'they had .either
secreted themselves within the State of California to p'revent
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scrvice of summons, or had resided outside'the"St~t~oiC~i~
fornia,' by reason of which respondent cour~ cletertt4tied
that at no time did it have the power to proceed to trial in
said action.
.
'."
.' 'Petitioners' contentions herein are twofold: .A,•. That We
motion to dismiss under section 583 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is not. a gener~l appearance, and, pl,~t,. ~her~fore,
the court had no right to ordcr the default 'of tp,e;,defen<iants
entered. B. That after five year$}lad elapsed: from th,e tim¢
an action is filed, and said cause haS not b~en, b~ough'/; to
trial, the trial court lc;>ses j:urisdiction oversai~' Mtion for
all purposes, except to dismiss the. sam~.
_,....
[1] "Whether an appearance is ge;neralc;>r,specialis determined by the character of the reliefsoughtand,not byt4~
intention of the party that it shall, or jilialLn.ot,,()perate.. a.sjl
general or speeial appearance, The statement Olea defendant
or party. th.a..t ~eis ma.king. a.' speci~l aP.' .earance is.,not. neces.~
sarily conclUSIve. [2] The testlS- . ld the.partt. appe&r
and object only to the consideration 0 . the' case Or Q,ily prOcedure in it because the court had no~ acquire(i, jurisdictipn
oftha perso?, of t~e defendant or PtrtyY ;rf so,then .the
appearance 18 speCIal. [S] It, howe,ver, he appe,arsan4
asks for any relief which could be given onlt toa p'ar:tyin
a pending case, or which itself would b~aregular procee,ding .
in the case; it is a general appearance regardless . of ~ho:W'
adroitly, carefully or directly the .appearance may be de;rloJriinated or charac~-ized as speciaL (l~ re Clarke, 125 CaL
388 [58 P ..22].) The rule in this regard may be epitomiZed
by saying tll,at if a defe,ndant by his appea.rance. insists onl1
upon the objection that· h~ is liot. in 'cQurt forwant6f jurisdiction over his personaild confines his .appearance for ,that
purpose only, then he has made a spec.W ,appel1:r:iiilce, but
if he raisesnny other questilin, or asks any reliet whichcari
only be granted upon the hypothesis that theco1irth~
jurisdiction of his person, the:n he had made.:a, ,gcIl,er_nlS;p:.
pelj.rance~(Oloese v~ Justioe's Oourt,lM Cat 82 [lOS,P..
317] ; Zobel v. Zobel, 151 Cal. 98 [gO ],>:., i91],), ;:'(
. [4] "In the instant case we ai'~ 'impr~sed that p~ti..
tioners in. seeking a. dismjssal of the case, ,pur~mm.to:,th~
provisi~ns of sectIon 583 of the Code'OfOivil:~rbeedUr.et;~e
,invokhig the affirmative action 'Of. thecottr1;; in: tlieir':,beliitlf<to
term:inate the litigation,. How they corildlipply;fo~:th~,t.~liaf:·
l!-s.ked oil any other theory than tMt ,they.;iwere .sublllittfrig;
themselves to the general jurisdiction of the court iii the'
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action is not apparent to us, because the relief they sought
was such as could be given only to a party in a pending
case. (Zobel v. Zobel, supra.)"
[5] The petitioners' claim that when an action is not
brought to trial within five years after the filing thereof, the
court loses jurisdiction thereof for all purposes, save only to
dismiss it, and that the court must exercise its obligatory
duty. Answering that contention, said Mr. Justice White,
the provisions of section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure
rE:quire the court to dismiss an action when the statutory
requirements are met. But, he correct~y observed, the rule
is not so rigid as· to be without exception, and an action
should not be dismissed when, as a result of the conduct or
action of a defendant, the plaintiff may not proceed to trial
with reasonable certainty that a judgment would conclusively determine the rights of the parties.
In the present case, .according to affidavits filed in 1940
in response to a motion to dismiss the action, the plaintiffs
were advised by persons living where the petitioners had
formerly made their home, that they were then residing without the State of California. Later, the petitioner Ross W.
Judson successfully moved the court to quash service of summons upon him. In connection with the petitioners' last motion, the rUling upon which is now. presented for determination, facts were shown which justified a finding that service
of summons had not been made upon them because of their
evasion ahd concealment.
Under these circumstances, to require the plaintiffs to take
the uncertain path of publication of summons against defendants who, they had been informed, were non-residents,
would reward subterfuge and make dishonesty profitable.
The courts have recognized that the statute relating to dis~
missals although ~andatory in form, should not be applied
where, although the defendant was not guilty of acts tending to obstruct the administration of justice, it would have
been impracticable for the plaintiff to have brought the
action t6 trial. (Ohristi'li v. Superior Oourt, 9 Ca1.2d· 526
[71 P.2d 205, 112 A.L.R. 1153J; Estate of Morrison, 125
Cal.App. 504 [14 P.2d 102J; and Kinard v. Jordan, 175
Cal. 13 [164 P. 894J.) The facts of the present case show
much greater justification for an exception to the statutory
requirement than those heretofore presented as the baSis for
an order denying a motion to dismiss.
Because of the former decisions, Mr. Justice White con-
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cluded, "the only hypothesis upon which the petitioners could
base their motion to dismiss under section 583 of the Code of
Civil Procedure was that respondent court had the power
to proceed to trial of said cause, and this hypothesis necessarily . prE;'supP9ses and includes that respondEmt court was
clothed with jurisdiction of the persons of petitioners. Such
appearance on the part of petitioners was therefore a general
appearance by them, and the ·fact that tliecourt denied I)eti- .
tioners' motion is of no consequenG€ in determining thena~
tureOftheirappea,rancc, any more than was t.hedesignation
of the same· by petitioners as a special app~arance. Having
made a general appearance and thereafter failing to plead iIi.
the action, and the eourt having correctly r,uled upon such
motion under the facts here· presented, no. error was committed by respondent court in directing' th~,entryof the,
default of said petitioners, and respondentcirart should hot
be restrained from entering a judgment agalIisfthem.'"
'.
Linden Gravel Mining 00. v. Sheplar,530at2~5;'isover:
mlea and·Anderson v. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151 fi43 p.5551;
is disapproved.
It .is ordered that the alternative writ i~ued herei~
discharged; the peremptory writ prayed for is denied.
TRAYNOR, J.~I dissent. It is my opinion that there,~
spondentcourt haS not acquired jurisdiction over the peti o'
tioners and should therefore be restrained from entering,s:
default judgment against them. While I agree .that .the COUtt· .
properly denied petitioners' motion, r do not believe that·
petitioners made a general appearance in seeking· adismissai
of .the action. Had they requested a ruling' that could "be
made only upon the hypothesis that the court.had jurJsdiction
over them, the appearance would be generalj,for'by.making
the request .they would admit that ~he court had jurisdiction,
thereby waiving its lack of jurisdiction. Thus; in the case
of l'lire Clarke, 125 Cal. 388 [58 P.22], relied upon in the
majority opinion, the defendant admitted the jUrisdiction of
the court by demurring to the complaint. .A court does. not'
sustain demurrers and decide moot questions of persons over .
whom it has no jurisdiction. Likewise, in Zobel v. Zobel, 151
Cal. 98 [90 P. 191J, cited in the majority opinion, the defen~
dant filed an answer, a pleading preparatory to a hearing
on the merits, which eould not be considered by the court if
it did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. I do not
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believe, however, that a defendant invadably makes a general
appearance by raising a question other than Iacl( of juris!liction, and I therefore disagree with the statements to the .
contrary in Olcese v. Justice's Ouurt, 156 Cal. 82 [103 P.
317], and Raps v. Raps, 20 Cal.2d 382 [125 P.2d.826]. It
has been held by this. court that by requesting and securing
an order e~tonQing time to plead, a defenda.nt does not make
a general appearjtnce or admit that the courtha~ acquired
jurisdict~on over his P!!rso:n. (l)enson v. l)enson, 176 Cal. 649
[170~. 1182.] ; DauenpQrt v. Superior Oourt, 183 Cal. 506
511 n~l,p;. 911J.) )\, ~ourt does not need jurisdiction over
the person to grapt such. au order, and there iR. no inconSistcUClY illrpqull$~illgSu~han order while mllintaining that
the c.ourt la('k~ jurjsd:ic.tioll. Similarly, aCOllrt without jhrisdiction over the person can dismiss an action under, section
58:l Of the Code of Civil ProcedUre, and tt defendant, }\rithout being inconsistent Or impliedly recol~nizirig the jurisdiction of the,colirt, can reql1est suchllllorder while maintaining
that the court lacks jurisdiction. There is nothing in section
583 to limit the cl:lss of persons Who can have actions dismissed. Neither e'll:pressly nOr by implication does'the statute
make a gf~nera1 appearance a condition of securing the. dismissal 6f an action t~rClihder.. Thus, in Sharpstein v. Eells,
132' Cal. 507 [G4 P. i080], in holding that an appearance to
dismiss an action for failure to S(.lrve a summons within the
three.·. years prescribed by Code ofCiviI Procedure section
581 (7), as amended in 1889, was a special appearance only,
the eourt declared: ", ... if defendant 'Vohlntl!tdly appears,
and answers,and demands Ii trial, after the three year/!!, the
court· bas.. jurisdictioh toproeeed. In this case thQrespondl1nt did hot. S(} appear. The:, fact that plaintiff, after t}jre.e
years, had the SUD.1InOns s{!rVedl1pon her, and that default
Was ept<>red, did not sho:w any consent or ,"oluntary' appear~
ance,:Whcn she appeared it was for the purpose of asking
that the· action be dismissed as to her. She had the right to
have it dismis:"ed." (See, also, Linden Gra'l)el!l!ining Co. v.
Sheplar, 530al. 245; Andersonv. Nawa, 25 Cal.App. 151' [143
P. 555J; Altpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable 00., 26 Cal.App.
705 [148 p~ 241] ; Me Baine, Practice: Objections to Jurisdiction Over the Person'and the Subject Matter, 30 CaI.L. Rev.
690.)
Petitioners' application fora rehearing was denied October
29, 1942. TraYnor, J.,voted for a rehearing..
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LUCY ·FAY BALES, Petitioner, v. THE; SU'rE.RIOB:
COURT OF 110S ANGELES COUNTY,Respondent.;i;lh.
[1]. Decedents' Estates ___ HeirshipProceedingS:-O-Dfifaults.-....:-The:.'
. omission £rom Prob. Code, §§1086~l,o$~,. r~lati.n~ tol1e~!!hip.
i>roceedin~s,

of the provisiol). £oradjl.'ldgin.1t dcfaul~scont~~n~d, ...
in former Gode Civ. Proc.~ § 1664,impliel!l1habroga,tt()no~ ~h~ ..

i~r:~fo!~o::~~t~en:!;~eina~;~~~:r~io~!la~tl:i~ltf:~:~t~e:~ ,

thority to order n default' against any' p~rsonwho had Jl,ot
.theretofore appMred therein.
[2]· Id.-Heirship Procecdings.--Trial-JU17.-Prob. Code, §l081.
providing for a jUry trial ili heirship proceedings, givese:r~ry
one ~laiming relrttioI\ship to ,the deceased, whether upon initiating petition or statement of heirship pr~sented after the
commencement of the procccd~ng, the right to hav:e all evicdeilC~ affecting the disposition o£.the issue submitted, to a jury.
The Frialcourt usurps the£unctions of ,a jury 'whet;l, on 'prelimirla,ry motion, it refuses to permit a claimant to participate
in the determination of such a procecding.
[3] Id~......Heh·shipProceedings-'-ClaimantsEnteri.l1gProceeding8;-'
In view of Prob, Code,§10!51,rc(ltigniZingthc,.rlght ,o~ .one
claiJli.in~ ,to be an heir of it deccdept' to enter or 'l'e~eJlter an
hej.rship proceeding prior to the' subniission,ofthe issueso!
factfor,decis~on, .U trial court hus~nodis.c:re~io~ai7~()wer' ,to'
exclude a.· clmmant mllrely because he secksc,titry Jnt~t {pe
proc(l('ding during the tri:tlofcertain questions of law, preliminary to thc impanelment of the jUry.
.
[4] Mandamus..,..,., To Courts-Hei~ship l'roceedingsi~A wrlt6:e
mandate will issue where a. ~uperior ()olirt byvoidordera·
IItrikes.'froman hoirship proceeding the appearuJlce Qfa. cJaiD:iant, and dismisses him from the proceeding, wher~ suc~ ord~rS
are not appealable :tnt! their review on appeaffrom the jl1dg~
mEmt determining heirship would not furnish an adequate
remedy.
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PROCEEDING in mandamus tp 'conipel the Superior Court.
of Los. Angeles County to permit pariicipatipn in. a pending
proceeding to determine heirship. Writ issued.
[1] Sec 23 Cal. Jur. 778.
(41 Sec 16 Cal. Jur. H20; 35 Am. Jur., 29.
.'
Mclt. Dig. References: [1, .3J Ilecedents' ;Estates, §987; [2] D.&.
cedents' Estates, § !lSS; [4J Mandamus, § 44.
.

